The Immigrants Intermarriage Premium: Italy 2004-2012 by Justiniano Medina, Adda Carla
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Website  www.ehl.lu.se 
 
 
Master in Economic Development and Growth 
 
 
 
 
 The Immigrants Intermarriage Premium:  
Italy 2004-2012 
 
Adda Carla Justiniano Medina 
 adda_carla.justiniano_medina.581@student.lu.se  
 
 
Abstract: This master thesis studies the impact of intermarriage on the 
earnings of immigrants in Italy compared to the co-ethnically married 
counterparts. Towards this end, instrumental variables are applied on Cross-
sectional data from the Income Survey (Il Bilancio delle Famiglie Italiane) 
which has been carried out within 2004 and 2012.  Intermarriage premium 
is not observed for the full sample. However, there is an intermarriage 
premium that exceeds 100% of earnings in individuals with the highest 
linguistic distance to Italian language and higher education. The soundness 
of the result has been further verified by considering the immigrants 
education, experience, language, the region and the years since migration. 
The premium is more accentuated for the male and it might indicate that 
intermarriage fosters the assimilation rate of this category of individuals.  
 
Key words: Integration, Immigration, Intermarriage premium. 
 
 
 
 
EKHM52 
Master thesis, second year (15 credits ECTS) 
August 2015  
Supervisor:  Jonas Helgertz 
Examiner: Fill out after the seminar 
Word Count: 15,505    
 
  
  
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A common feature in most of the developed countries has been the 
attraction of workers, that is, immigration. Developed countries have 
become plural societies and social cohesion has become a priority. 
Integration of immigrants within the destination country is an effective tool 
to obtain social cohesion and it is one of the first goals established by the 
European Commission.  
Italy has seen the number of its foreign-born population grow in the 
last decades, immigrant residents amount to almost 5 million, of which, 3 
million are active workers and about 600.000 are students (Ambrosini, 
2013). Despite this reality, the prevailing public opinion in Italy denies the 
idea of having a multi-ethnic society. Media and some political forces, make 
it even more difficult for the Italian society to accept immigrants as part of 
the society, and consequently for the immigrants to integrate, as it has been 
evidenced in literature (Ambrosini, 2013; Zanfrini, 2013; Allasino, Reyneri, 
Venturini & Zincone, 2004; Venturini & Villosio, 2004; Venturini & 
Villosio, 2006). As a result, the Italian society is facing a dilemma between 
the preferences and reality: how to build social cohesion in a society that 
has newly become multiethnic.  
The intermarriage rate is the ultimate indicator of social cohesion; it 
indicates the acceptance of the immigrant population in the new society and 
also, the acceptance of the native population by the immigrants (Furtado & 
Song, 2014; Dribe & Nystedt, 2010; Meurs, 2010; Nekby, 2010; Gevrek, 
2009; Furtado & Theodoropoulos, 2009; Dribe and Lundh, 2008; 
Kantarevic, 2004 and Alba and Golden, 1986, inter alia). However it is 
hypothesized that intermarriages entail economic integration of immigrants. 
Thus, the question is, whether there is an intermarriage premium that might 
positively indicate economic integration.  
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Intermarriage is the partnership between individuals with different 
ethnic backgrounds, for this case, between a native and an immigrant. 
However, intermarriage does not solely indicate the degree of integration of 
the two social forces. It has been outlined in literature that inter-ethnic 
marriage determines an efficient environment for the integration of 
immigrants (Kantarevic, 2004: Dribe & Lundh, 2008, Gevrek, 2009, 
Notemeyer, 2010, Furtado & Theodoropoulos, 2009), therefore it also 
fosters assimilation. The benefits might lie in the information that native 
spouses share about culture and local job market opportunities, along with 
their networks, and additionally the language proficiency might also 
improve. All of these in favor of the human and social capital of the 
intermarried immigrant. The policy implications might involve substituting 
these types of services by offering language courses, or job search 
strategies, as an example (Furtado & Theodoropoulos, 2009). 
Around six percent of the natives in Europe have formed mixed 
marriages with immigrants and more noticeably in some countries, as much, 
as one third of immigrants have formed mixed marriages with the natives 
(Adsera & Ferrer, 2014). Even though these figures might confirm 
relevancy, Most of the studies regarding intermarriages premium have been 
mainly concentrated on the northern European countries such as Germany, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands, or in other continents (e.g. United States and 
Australia)  (Furtado &  Song, 2014; Furtado & Theodoropoulos, 2009; 
Kantarevic, 2004 and Alba and Golden, 1986, in the United States; Dribe & 
Nystedt, 2010; Nekby, 2010 and Dribe and Lundh, 2008 in Sweden; 
Nottmeyer, 2010 in Germany; Meng and Meurs, 2010 in France; Gevrek, in 
the Netherlands and Meng & Gregory, 2005 in Australia). Even though the 
outcome of these studies are influential and can be expanded over other 
European zones, the southern European countries have received less 
attention in the relevant literature. The geographical position of these 
countries makes them more accessible and potentially vulnerable for 
immigration. Thus, these countries have been receiving immigrants over 
decades, earlier than 1980s.  
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For decades, Italy has shown to be an appealing target for mass 
migration among other southern European countries and it embraces 
immigrants from different nations. 
Irregular immigration makes the integration process slower, thus, 
there are further steps to be accomplished before being even recognized as 
part of the new society. 
Italy attracts ‘unregulated’ immigration mainly because of three 
factorss: i) the geographical exposure to emigration countries and ii) its 
location which is surrounded by other developed countries that traditionally 
attract immigration. Therefore, Italy attracts transition immigrants. Lastly, 
iii) Italy has a relatively high informal economy (Allasino, Reyneri, 
Venturini & Zincone, 2004) which facilitates the absorption of irregular 
workers, who ignore the local legislature in the matter and who are disposed 
to work with limited benefits and no recognition of their rights or few rights 
compared to the standards of the whole country, given their weak position. 
Therefore, studying the integration of the immigrants in Italy seems 
to be demanding and can be a perfect complement to the previous 
researches in the same direction. Moreover, the outcome of this research 
work on the intermarriages of immigrants in Italy can be easily extended to 
other South European countries which share the same geographical 
characteristics, which for some, maybe the weakest, could be seen as ‘the 
gate to Europe’.   
The research question that this study aims to address is “to what 
extent does intermarriage increase the earnings of immigrants in Italy, 
respect to the co-ethnically married counterparts?” 
The following section presents the state of the art, discussing the 
literature on the intermarriage premium. Section 3 describes the theoretical 
foundations that support the hypothesis of the intermarriage premium. 
Section 4 presents the background of Italy as a host society. Section 5 
presents the description of the dataset used in the econometric analysis. 
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Section 6 describes the methodology used to address the research question. 
Section 7 presents the results and the discussion of the results is given in 
Section 8. Finally Section 9 concludes the findings. 
2. The State of Art 
Literature on the intermarriages premium is relatively recent, and it 
is mainly focused on the male immigrants, since, as some studies argue, the 
intermarried female immigrants have a difficult interpretation in the labor 
market outcomes (Notemeyer, 2010, Gevrek, 2009, inter alia), however, this 
could be partly justified with the theory of the household division of labor 
(Becker, 1973). 
The numerous studies operate diverse methodologies, as the main 
obstacle to finding a relationship between earnings and intermarriage is the 
endogeneity of intermarriage premium. On the hypothesis to be tested, 
Intermarriage should affect positively earnings positively; however, 
intermarried immigrants are likely to be a selected subsample from the 
population of immigrants. Since intermarried and endogamously married 
are different in many observable variables, they are likely to be different 
also in non-observables, and these could be correlated to earnings, the 
dependent variable. Therefore, it is mandatory to consider intermarriage not 
only as exogenous, but also as an endogenous variable for the earnings 
equation. 
There are prevalently two methodologies in literature that account 
for endogeneity of intermarriage, which depend strongly on the type of 
dataset available. The studies that make use of instrumental variables 
methods are performed on cross-sectional data. While, when panel datasets 
are available, the authors make use of fixed effects methodologies, panel 
datasets are superior, since only in this way can be attributed a causal effect. 
However, it is important to notice the comparison group, when cross-
sectional datasets are available, the comparison group is usually 
endogamous married immigrants, while one might also find the non-married 
immigrants as a integrative part of the comparison group, the non-married 
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constitute the main comparison group when the individual fixed effects 
model is applied. In other studies that make use of panel datasets, some 
account for distributed fixed effects or regional fixed effects. While these 
fixed effects methodologies allow avoiding bias for unobservable variables 
that could be correlated with intermarriage and earnings. However, the main 
interest is on individual fixed effects that might capture factors affecting 
intermarriage and earnings that are unobserved and fixed over time, which 
can be captured only at the individual level, such as: ambition, 
communications ability, socializations ability or even physical beauty,  
As follows the studies found in literature which analyze the 
intermarriage premium are briefly explained. 
In the United States, Kantarevic (2004) used cross sectional data 
from 1970 and 1980. The sample included only immigrants who were not 
married at the time of migration. She accounted for endogeneity using an 
endogenous switching regime, where she estimated two regressions and 
extracted the differences between the earnings of intermarried and non-
intermarried foreign born individuals; this difference was linked thereafter, 
to the probability of intermarriage. Additionally, Kantarevic applied an 
instrumental variables methodology, using the probability of inter-ethnic 
marriage, that is, the number of unmarried immigrants of an ethnic group, in 
a state, over the number of foreign born of an ethnic group, in all the states, 
this ratio is at the same time divided by the ratio of unmarried natives in a 
specific state over the number of natives in all the states, this variable is a 
proxy to the sex ratio variable. The variables in this ratio are related to the 
opposite sex of the foreign born, and is limited to individuals between 16 to 
65 years old. The expected relationship between the instrument and 
propensity to marriage is negative; the weakness of this instrument is that it 
could also be an instrument to marriage. Kantarevic concluded that the 
probability of interethnic marriage was depending on the difference between 
earnings of intermarried and endogamously married foreign born, further 
on, the results point out that there is a raw intermarriage premium of 8%, 
respect to the endogamously-married immigrants. The hourly wages are also 
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higher for intermarried individuals; this is also indicating a higher 
productivity of intermarried individuals. The premium vanishes once 
endogeneity is taken into account, indicating a positive selection into 
intermarriage. 
Furtado and Song (2014) on the other hand used OLS on census 
combined with survey data from 1980 to 2005. They concluded that the 
intermarriage premium is positive and has been increasing in the last years. 
Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2009) studied the relationship 
between occupation and intermarriage using an instrumental variables 
approach, finding a positive relationship between employment likelihood 
and intermarriage. 
Meng and Meurs (2006) studied the intermarriage premium in 
France, using cross-sectional data from 1990, the sample includes only 
immigrants aged 20 to 59 years old, and the sample comprises mainly 
immigrants from seven regions, which accounts for more than 60% of the 
immigrant population. The author compares intermarried immigrants to 
endogenously married immigrants. The authors addresses endogeneity using 
an IV approach, where the instruments used are sex ratio, defined as the 
number of females over the number of males, for males and the number of 
males over the number of females, for the female population, in a given 
region from the respective ethnicity in the same age group. This ratio states 
the competition for marrying, the larger the ratio the less the competition in 
the marriage market and the probability of searching a spouse outside of 
their own ethnic group becomes smaller (Angrist, 2002; Meng and Gregory, 
2005, cited in Meng and Meur, 2006). The second instrument used by the 
authors is the probability to marry within the respective ethnic group, it is 
composed as the number of females of the same ethnic group over the 
number of females in the entire population, for the males and the opposite 
for the females, the higher this ratio, the more likely it is to meet someone 
from their own ethnic group. The raw premium, from the OLS estimate is 
6.2%, woman earnings of intermarriage are higher, 9.3% against 5.2% for 
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men. Once controlling for endogeneity, the intermarriage premium increases 
to a general 36% and a 94% for the female sample, while or the male 
sample it is 27%, this increase indicates a negative selection into 
intermarriage, that is, the characteristics that influence an individual to 
marry a native influence negatively his or her earnings.  
Meng and Gregory (2005), in Australia, use an IV approach and 
conclude that intermarried foreign born earnings are considerably higher 
than the endogamously married. After taking into account endogeneity of 
intermarriage, the premium increases indicating a negative selection into 
intermarriage.  
In Germany, Nottmeter (2010) uses fixed effects methodology on a 
panel data, focusing on male immigrants. The main findings indicated, first 
that the raw premium of marriage is higher for those who are intermarried, 
compared to the endogamously married immigrants. Secondly, once fixed 
effects approach is applied, to account for heterogeneity, the premium 
vanishes, however in this case the author compares intermarried with single 
individuals. The decrease in the premium might indicate positive selection. 
A further conclusion is that intermarried immigrants receive higher returns 
to experience, the author accounted for short and long term effects, where 
short term effects were captured in the marriage moment while long term 
effects were captured with the experience acquired in the course of 
marriage.   
In Sweden, Dribe and Nystedt (2010) use panel data on male 
immigrants between the years from 1990 to 2009, comparing intermarried 
individuals to endogamously married and to never married individuals. 
They account for heterogeneity and endogeneity using a fixed effects 
method, where the unobserved factors that might affect earnings that are 
fixed over time are accounted for, however, language skills were excluded 
from the regressions, the problem arises because language skills might not 
be fixed over time, but might be related to earnings and intermarrying 
potential (Nekby, 2010). The authors used also a distributed fixed effect 
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method, where the intermarriage premium is allowed to vary over time. The 
longer period span availability allows the researchers to control for 
heterogeneity, that is, self-selection, and additionally to the intermarried 
individuals, the study included cohabiting couples. The crude intermarriage 
premium indicated from the OLS estimates is around. 17%. However, when 
the endogeneity is accounted for, the premium drops to 6%. The 
diminishing of the premium validates the self-selection hypothesis, that is, 
individuals with higher earnings potential are positively selected into 
intermarriage. Statistical significance is found only for Asia and Mena area, 
those whose culture is likely to be more distant from the Swedish culture; 
this is to confirm that the benefits of marrying a native are major for those, 
whose culture is more dissimilar to the one of the natives. 
Nekby (2010) also used a panel data between the years from 1998-
2005 of males and females foreign born, accounting for individual 
heterogeneity, with a staggered fixed effects, comparing intermarried 
individuals to endogamously married individuals and intermarried 
individuals to individuals who are yet to marry a native. The main results 
pointed out a significant pre-marriage income growth, which materializes 
from 1 to 3 years prior to the intermarriage. There is no increase in wages 
for those who marry natives, beyond the endogamously-married premium. 
The raw premium is higher for males than that for females and it drops 
when endogeneity is accounted for, indicating a positive self-selection. The 
improvement of the study respect to previous estimates is in the more 
appropriate control group. 
In Sweden Dribe and Lundh (2008) use cross sectional data from 
year 2003 and studied the patterns of intermarriage. They found that 
intermarriage is associated to higher earnings and employment rates. 
In the Netherland, Gevrek (2009) uses three waves of cross sectional 
datasets, from the years 1994, 1998 and 2002 of the four largest minorities 
of immigrants in the Netherlands, which are Antilleans, Surinamese, Turks 
and Moroccans. Additionally, Gevrek is able to distinguish first generation 
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from second generation, which improves previous research on the 
distinction of immigrants who are born in the destination country, but still, 
with a diverse ethnic background from the native population the union with 
the individuals is identified as endogamous marriage. A further 
improvement is in the distinction of the moment of marriage, which leads to 
properly formulate the instrument. The author compares endogamously 
married to intermarried foreign born individuals. Gevrek measures 
economic integration as employment and earnings. The author finds that the 
employment likelihood has a positive relationship with intermarriage; 
however, the latter is higher for the first generation of immigrants. 
Furtherly, Gevrek analyzes the link between intermarriage and earnings 
using an IV methodology and a standard full information likelihood 
estimation procedure, (Discrete Factor Method, proposed firstly by Mroz in 
1999). The instruments used are group size and sex ratio (previously 
discussed). Group size indicates the size of the respective group of the 
foreign born, over that of the Netherlands. The weakness of this instrument 
is lies in the exclusion restriction, since a bigger group size might indicate 
greater integration to the Dutch society. Furtherly, an immigrant could also 
benefit if the respective group size is bigger, since more connections could 
be stablished and in this way benefit the labor market outcomes. The results 
indicate a raw intermarriage premium of 5%. After accounting for 
endogeneity, the premium increases to 30%, this indicates that intermarried 
foreign born are negatively selected into intermarriage. However, the results 
suggest that intermarried immigrants earn more than endogamously married 
only on the first generation of immigrants. 
The results here described in general favor the hypothesis that 
immigrants are positively selected into marriage. However there appears to 
be a trend in the results, that could depends on the used methodology. In this 
way when instrumental variable are used, intermarried immigrants are 
positively selected, while with fixed effects they are negatively selected into 
intermarriage, that is, immigrants with a low potential of earnings have 
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higher propensity to marry a native, or the non-observable contribute 
negatively to intermarry and to earnings.  
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
The aim of the analysis is on the relationship between intermarriage 
and the economic assimilation of the immigrants, where economic 
assimilation is measured by earnings. 
At the moment of arrival, the position of the immigrant in the labor 
market is disadvantaged, in part because his/her human capital is devalued, 
since it might be difficult for the employer to evaluate it or it might be 
simply be invalid, if mismatching the local needs (Dribe & Lundh, 2008). 
However, this situation might change in the process of assimilation, which 
implies the improvement of language proficiency and job searching 
strategies through a better knowledge of the local labor market (Chiswick 
1978). It is postulated that intermarriage accelerates this process. However, 
in the literature of the intermarriage premium there are two competing 
hypotheses: the productivity hypothesis and the selection hypothesis. While 
empirical exercises tend to support the selection hypothesis, in literature 
there are presented various theories which support both of the hypothesis, 
discussed as follows. 
The productivity hypothesis, according to which immigrants married 
to native-born spouses assimilate faster than comparable immigrants 
married to foreign-born spouses. This is because spouses play an integral 
role in human capital accumulation. According to the productivity 
hypothesis, intermarriage fosters economic integration as native spouses 
boost linguistic adjustment; provide knowledge of the local labor market, 
access to social networks, and insight into important structures. In addition, 
they explain local customs, norms, and peculiarities, furtherly intermarriage 
also signals greater adaptability and attachment to the receiving country, all 
of these contributing positively to the local specific- human capital of the 
immigrant.  
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The social theory puts emphasis on the importance of the social 
capital in the immigrant economic integration (Aguilera 2002, 2005, 
mentioned in Gevrek, 2009). Second of this theory immigrants are 
disadvantaged because their network is composed mainly by members of 
their own ethnic community, who are less informed about the labor market 
respect to the natives, i.e. job positions and job searching procedures. 
Intermarriage gives access to native networks. Enjoying a native network 
could have a positive impact on earnings; networks could provide 
information on the job opportunities. Recommendations from a native might 
also give more confidence to the potential employer in the hiring process. 
Further on, intermarrying might give signals to the labor market of a better 
integration respect to other immigrants and attachment to the host society 
(Furtado & Theodoropoulos, 2009). 
According to the Family Investment Hypothesis (Worswick 1999; 
Baker and Benjamin 1997; Blau et al. 2003, all cited in Gevrek, 2009), the 
assimilation of the immigrant might differ depending on his or her family 
structure. Since immigrants are assumed to be credit constrained, in order to 
invest in human capital or wait to find a job with a higher salary they should 
rely on other members of the family, resulting on dead end jobs for the 
secondary member. Therefore, mixed families are less credit constraint and 
do not need to rely on other family members, this result in higher 
investment in specific human capital and they can also afford to wait for a 
job with a higher salary. Further on, marrying a native might affect the 
human capital but also give a better orientation on how investing in human 
capital could give higher returns, if natives are better informed on the 
structural status of economy. 
The selection hypothesis, according to which, the relationship 
between intermarriages and assimilation is spurious because intermarried 
immigrants are a selected subsample from the population of all married 
immigrants, who possesses highly valued labor market skills that are also 
highly valued in the native marriage market, these can be local language 
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proficiency, knowledge of customs, and even physical beauty (Kantarevic, 
2004).  
According to Becker (1974), in general individuals prefer spouses 
with similar assortment of resources. However, the partner does not need to 
have the same amount in each resource, but needs to compensate when poor 
in a resource with abundance in another. In the local marriage market, an 
immigrant with higher education has a resource that could be bargained 
with a native who is willing to trade endogamy for a highly educated spouse 
(Furtado and Theodoropoulos, 2009). In addition, immigrants acquiring 
local human capital might intermarry more often, also because educational 
institutions provide platforms to meet natives; this in combination with 
language proficiency allows immigrants to approach others, including the 
natives (Furtado & Theodoropoulos, 2009). Moreover, more educated 
immigrants are more likely to move away from traditional enclaves from 
his/her ethnic group and live in areas where the neighborhood is composed 
mainly by natives which in turn increase the likelihood of intermarrying 
(Dribe & Lundh, 2008). Therefore, intermarried immigrants might be a 
highly selective group from the immigrant population. 
The empirical evidence analyzing these hypotheses, in general 
favors the selection hypothesis. Intermarried immigrants tend to be 
positively self-selected into intermarriage, in other words, those who have 
potential for higher earnings are more likely to marry a native.  
However, it is also recognized in literature that intermarriage could 
be uneasy and even costly; it could result in segregation and suppression of 
the potential benefits. 
As stated by Notemeyer (2010) intermarriage can also induce costs 
on the immigrant. As a matter of fact, an individual that marries a spouse 
from a different ethnic background might not enjoy the support of his or her 
own ethnic group.  This could negatively affect earnings if they can no 
longer rely on the networks of their own ethnic community to find a job. 
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Further on, an immigrant that intermarries could also suffer from lack of 
tolerance from the native spouse connections. In this way an intermarried 
immigrant could suffer the intolerance from both sides, which could also 
have a negative impact on earnings. Furtherly, even if the native network 
shares information about a high skill job opening, with the intermarried 
immigrant, this might not be suitable for him/her if a low skilled (Furtado & 
Theodoropoulos, 2009). In many ways, a native network might not 
necessarily be advantageous for an intermarried immigrant. A network of 
his her own ethnic group could provide useful information about job 
opportunities more suitable to the specific skills of an immigrant. 
However, it is important to notice that the intermarriage rate might 
vary depending on the ethnic group. Second of the segmented assimilation 
theory (Portes and Zhou, 1993, cited in Furtado and Song, 2014), the 
integration might differ among the various ethnic groups of immigrants, 
since the assimilation of immigrants is closely related to the experience of 
previous immigrant groups from the same origin, in this way some groups 
could have been integrated and perceived to be more similar to the native 
population, while other groups could still be marginalized and 
discriminated. In this manner, the integration of an ethnic group, mirrored 
by the intermarriage rate might differ among different ethnic groups. 
In sum, intermarriage could be a result of a high earnings potential 
or could boost them, it could favor integration or as argued, in highly 
intolerant groups or societies it could result in segregation.  
This is what in theories is found, however the legislative, historic 
and political background, might have a heavy impact on immigration and 
intermarriage. 
4. Background of Italy as a host society 
Italy started being an immigration country in the decade of the 80s 
(Venturini & Villosio, 2006; Allasino, Reyneri, Venturini & Zincone, 2004 
and Zanfrini, 2003), as a matter of fact, during this decade the immigration 
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flows were comparable to those of Germany and Britain (Allasino, Reyneri, 
Venturini & Zincone, 2004). However, immigration in Italy appears to have 
started as a consequence of the economic crisis in the year 1973 which 
involved most economies. After the year 1973/74 traditionally attractive 
countries for immigrants closed their frontiers to new immigration; 
immigrants thereafter opted for southern European countries, which borders 
were less regulated (Allasino, Reyneri, Venturini & Zincone, 2004).  
It is a fact that Italy attracts mainly illegal immigration; estimations 
from the early biggest flows of people suggest that about half were irregular 
immigrants (Mauri & Micheli, 1992 cited in Allasino, Reyneri, Venturini & 
Zincone, 2004), the figures however are difficult to rely on, since irregular 
immigration is not visible to the officials and the number could be 
undervalued. The sectors where immigrant labor is located in Italy are 
mainly composed by small factories and domestic assistance, sectors with 
traditionally predominant informal economy (Allasino, Reyneri, Venturini 
& Zincone, 2004). Moreover, the amendments for irregular immigrants 
contribute to the perception that the regular entrance in the territory is less 
effective (Allasino, Reyneri, Venturini & Zincone, 2004). Second of 
Zanfrini (2013) immigrants were attracted by the facility of staying in spite 
of an irregular status. The author also outlines that the immigrant flows 
were spontaneous, that is, they were not the effect of recruiting policies and 
they were not linked from the colonial past either. 
Even tough, the scenario in Italy called for legislature on 
regularization rather than calling for new entries; the amendments were in 
fact used to regularize individuals who were already present in the territory, 
but who were not holding a valid permit of stay and work. 
The first law on migration dated 1986 (943/1986), well ten years 
after the first flows of immigrants, the law allowed entrance with work 
permit, after which there was a moderate number of entrances in Italy 
(Zanfrini, 2013). Further on, the law acknowledged few social rights to 
immigrant workers. The law 39/1990 included regulations which concerned 
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self-employment, legal protection, asylum and expulsion (Zanfrini, 2013). 
Only in 1998, there was a set of rules, destined for the integration of 
immigrants in Italy (286/98) this set of rules was based on four principles: 
security; safeguard of human rights; acknowledgement of the same social 
and civil rights as Italian citizens and pluralism, that is, respect and 
safeguard of the cultural differences, language and religion (Zanfrini, 2013).  
The law 40/98, allowed the entrance for job searching. The latter led 
to a growth of 1/3 on the entrances already in 1999 (Allasino, Reyneri, 
Venturini & Zincone, 2004).  
Finally, there was an increase in the legal entries, this derived 
mainly because of two reasons. First, in 1992 there was approved a law on 
citizenship, based on Italian descent principle (Zanfrini, 2013), this allowed 
descendants of Italian acquire the Italian citizenship, even if they had never 
lived in Italy. Secondly, the legal entrances started growing, with the family 
reunions starting in 1996 (Allasino, Reyneri, Venturini & Zincone, 2004). 
Recent figures from the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT, year 2011) 
show that entries for family reunification constitute nearly half of the new 
entries nowadays. 
In 2002 there was turning point in the reform. The law approved in 
2002 was meant to limit the benefits if immigrants, limiting the entry 
possibilities, restricting the permanency, increasing the measures and 
penalties for irregular immigration and resetting the requirement of 
availability of vacancies for working immigrants (Zanfrini, 2013; Allasino, 
Reyneri, Venturini & Zincone, 2004).  However, during this year there was 
an amendment that allowed regularizing workers, the latter was destined to 
regularize the situation of home assistance, after more than 300,000 Italian 
families recognized to have hired irregular workers for home services 
(Zanfrini, 2013; Allasino, Reyneri, Venturini & Zincone, 2004). 
Further on, in 2008, it was approved a package of norms dictated to 
restrict the position of immigrants (pacchetto sicurezza). For this new set of 
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rules illegal stay or illegal entry in the Italian territory constituted a crime. 
The set of rules were revised in 2011 after being put in discussion by the 
European Court of Justice as infringing some of the fundamental human 
rights (Zanfrini, 2013). 
Although the laws and reforms allowed a number of regularizations, 
the number was not matching the demand for regularizations. The gap 
between the granted authorizations and the entrances in the labor market 
without a working permit are an evident outcome (Zanfrini, 2013). In 
literature the reasons attributed to this gap are mainly three: First the 
established quotas are undersized. Second, the procedures to legalize 
irregular work are not concealing the fact that the immigrant work is mainly 
absorbed by households and micro factories; therefore the burocratic load 
on the employers is at least, discouraging. Finally, since those who are to be 
regular workers need to have a valid working permit, they cannot opt for 
regularizing their work if they do not already hold a permit. Further on, an 
additional obstacle is set by the nature of the shadow economy, which is 
thought to absorb a substantial part of irregular workers (Zanfrini, 2013). In 
conclusion, the gap is a result of a mismatch between the flow decrees and 
the applications, in size and characteristics of the labor. 
Further on, the decrees that take the form of amendments could 
foster illegal procedures, creating fictitious works, which could be simulated 
by relatives or friends or by the criminal market. The decrees are 
mismatching the applications, but, even more importantly, the spontaneous 
flow of immigrants, are mismatching the potential integration in the host 
society (Zanfrini, 3013).  
4.1. Current state of the immigrants economic demography 
According to figures from the las Census, year 2011, there are 
currently 4,570,317 of foreigners living in Italy, with a valid permit of stay. 
Allasino, Reyneri, Venturini and Zincone (2004) pointed out that 
immigration in Italy was ethnically fragmented. In fact, figures from the 
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year 2001 evidenced that the biggest minority, Moroccans were 11,6 % of 
total immigrants followed by Albanians (10,6%), Romanians (5,5%), 
Filipinos (4,7%), Chinese (4,1%), Tunisians (3,4%), Americans (3,2%), 
citizens from ex-Yugoslavia (2,7%), Germans (2,6%) and Senegalese 
(2,5%).  Figures of the last year of Census, 2011, however, show that the 
shares have been changing, in fact the ten biggest, according to the figures 
are: Romanians, with nearly a Million of people, followed by Albanians, 
with nearly half a million of people, Moroccans, with a bit more than 
450,000 people, Chinese people follow, exceeding  the 200,000 people, the 
trend of people arriving have been increasing constantly in the last ten 
years, Ukrainians exceed 200,000 individuals by few, and the trend of 
people arriving have been slowed down after the crisis, after the year 2007, 
however the number of people from Ukraine has grown by more than ten in 
the last ten years.  Filipinos are the sixth biggest minority, the growth of the 
population of Filipinos citizens, however appears more flat, particularly 
after the crisis and there are actually around 140,000 individuals living in 
Italy. The seventh biggest minority is placed by the citizens from Moldova, 
there are actually nearly 135,000 individuals living in Italy, coming from 
Moldova, the trend of individuals arriving to the Italian territory have been 
somewhat stable, at the beginning of the decade there were nearly 5,000 
Moldavians living in Italy, the year 2004 this number was five times bigger, 
afterwards the trend stabilized. The eighth biggest minority living in Italy is 
Indians, however, just until the year 2010 there were more Indians than 
Moldavians in Italy, Nowadays there are nearly 120,000 Indians living in 
Italy, at the beginning of the decade there were around 35,000 Indians the 
trend of individuals arriving to Italy has been stable, even during the crisis. 
To Indians follow individuals from Poland, there are around 110,000 people 
from Poland living in Italy, at the beginning of the decade there were nearly 
30,000, the trend of pole citizens arriving in Italy has not been growing  a 
lot, compared to other minorities, however, it appears stable. Since the year 
2006 to the year 2009 the number of poles was exceeding the number of 
Indians living in Italy. The last biggest minority is placed by the Tunisians. 
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At the beginning of the decade there were nearly 60,000 Tunisians living in 
Italy, in the year 2011 the number grew to around 105,000.  
In conclusion, the minorities have changed the shares in the last 
decade; however they continue being fragmented, except for the Romanian 
population, which share of the immigrant population is the highest, reaching 
nearly the 20% of it. 
Allasino, Reyneri, Venturini and Zincone (2004) noted that 
occupation of immigrants in Italy differs among regions; this is due to the 
local structure of the Economy. In the North eastern and central regions 
(Emilia Romagna and Marche) there is mainly small manufacturing firms 
employing immigrants. In the North eastern regions there is also labor 
demand from agriculture, which is seasonal. Domestic labor is relevant only 
in the central cities of Bologna and Florence. The cities of Rome and Milan 
demand labor mainly for families, that is, domestic labor, and services for 
the quality of urban life, such as restoring and cleaning services. In 
Lombardi there is also some demand from small manufacturing companies. 
Finally the southern regions in which bigger cities labor demand is mainly 
due to domestic labor and in the rural areas demand seasonal labor for the 
agriculture. 
Intermarriage might be limited due to the nature of the sector where 
the immigrants are mainly employed. For example, where labor among 
female immigrants is composed mainly by domestic care givers (for elderly, 
children and housekeeping), where the employed lives with the family and 
often restrict to 12 daily working hours, seasonal workers are also limited in 
this sense. However, it is intuitive to consider this category of workers as 
having a higher rate of return migration, for who integration is not in 
consideration. 
Some relevant facts about the immigrants’ economic demography 
are firstly given by the origin country. The official figures of the census 
allow to partly reflecting the group size present in the territory of the host 
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society, however in aggregate numbers, this says few about how 
intermarriage incidence might vary because of it. The descriptive nature of 
literature in intermarriage is widely diffused. The marriage patterns can tell 
indicators how closed are the groups in a society, in this sense a descriptive 
focus has much to say (Kalmijn, 1998). Studies are many times limited to 
percentages which are limited by the group size which makes difficult to 
make comparisons across the different groups (Kalmijn, 1998). Thus, 
reporting absolute values of group size it seems mandatory to for a valid 
interpretation. 
4.2. Intermarriage facts 
Mixed marriages, where one spouse was Italian native and one 
foreigner, celebrated in the year 2011 were around 18,000. However 
marriages in Italy are decreasing since 1972, as mixed marriages in 2011 
were 5,555 less respect to the year 2007.  
Figure 1 shows the trend of marriages where at least one spouse is 
foreign born, however it worth clarifying that the definition of foreign born 
from the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) corresponds to the individual 
who has not acquired the Italian citizenship, either by birth, marriage, 
residence or descent. 
The most evident trend is that marriages with a foreign born spouse 
are consistently growing. The share of mixed marriages where the wife is 
Italian is small compared to the one where the husband is Italian, the trend 
is also flatter. Endogamous marriages where both of the spouses are foreign 
are constantly increasing with a steeper slope respect to the mixed 
marriages. All the trends decrease after the financial crisis in 2008 and then 
recovers, of mixed and endogamous marriages.  
In general there is an opening towards marriages where at least one 
spouse is a foreigner; this should be interpreted as a positive sign of 
integration. Even if the two partners are foreign, if they start by marrying in 
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the host society it probably is because they foresee a good prospect for their 
future in the host country. 
 
FIGURE 1: Marriages where at least one spouse is foreign born. Years 1995-2011, 
absolute values. 
 
Source: Istat, Census 2011. http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/75517 
 
 
These series of figures 1 allow understanding the general trend in the 
marriages of immigrants, mixed or endogamous in the host society. 
However, Italy is a various country with a diversified a territory. In broad 
lines, the wealthiest regions in Italy are the northern ones, followed by the 
center of the country, the south and at last the islands. It might be the case 
that the immigrant population be logically distributed following this 
criterion. In order to understand the intermarriage with a regional optic, 
figure 2 presents endogamous marriages, from native and immigrants and 
mixed marriages.  This allows comparing the different types of marriage, 
per region and in the country. 
In the country average, perhaps logically, native endogamous 
marriages are the highest; the lowest are the foreign endogamous marriages, 
while mixed marriages are situated between the two. The average 
intermarriage rate is 13%, endogamous marriages between immigrants are 
4.2%, in the country average. 
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FIGURE 2: Marriages, by citizenship combination, year 2011, absolute values and 
percentages 
REGION 
Type of marriage 
Both spouses Italian One foreign spouse Both foreign spouses 
Absolut 
values 
% values 
Absolut 
values 
% values 
Absolut 
values 
% values 
       Piedmont 11,427 84.6 2,088 15.4 603 4.5
Valle d'Aosta 354 85.9 58 14.1 13 3.2 
Liguria 4,256 82.4 907 17.6 227 4.4 
Lombardi 23,647 84.0 4,489 16.0 1,250 4.4 
Trentino-Alto Adige 2,956 78.8 796 21.2 330 8.8 
Bolzano 1,496 73.9 528 26.1 270 13.3 
Trento 1,460 84.5 268 15.5 60 3.5 
Veneto 12,299 79.4 3,197 20.6 1,417 9.1 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 2,846 81.4 652 18.6 158 4.5 
Emilia-Romagna 10,278 82.3 2,206 17.7 563 4.5 
Tuscany 9,597 77.0 2,866 23.0 1,416 11.4 
Umbria 2,456 81.0 576 19.0 197 6.5 
Marche 3,956 85.0 699 15.0 153 3.3 
Lazio 15,774 84.7 2,856 15.3 873 4.7 
Abruzzo 3,493 89.2 421 10.8 64 1.6 
Molise 918 92.7 72 7.3 6 0.6 
Campania 23,295 92.3 1,939 7.7 956 3.8 
Puglia 15,698 95.7 704 4.3 49 0.3 
Basilicata 2,073 94.2 128 5.8 12 0.5 
Calabria 7,984 94.4 470 5.6 37 0.4 
Sicily 19,667 94.7 1,101 5.3 204 1.0 
Sardinia 5,239 93.0 392 7.0 84 1.5 
Italy 178,213 87.0 26,617 13.0 8,612 4.2 
Nord-west 39,684 84.0 7,542 16.0 2,093 4.4 
Nord-east 28,379 80.6 6,851 19.4 2,468 7.0 
Center 31,783 82.0 6,997 18.0 2,639 6.8 
South 53,461 93.5 3,734 6.5 1,124 2.0 
Islands 24,906 94.3 1,493 5.7 288 1.1 
              
Source: Istat, Census 2011. http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/75517 
 
Endogamous marriages with both spouses being immigrants are 
higher in the north east and center of the country, where the percentage 
situates below the country average, while in the south and the islands 
endogamous foreign marriages represent just 1% of all the marriages. It 
might be intuitive to consider that the number of endogamous marriages 
could simply reflect the limited presence of foreigners in the region; 
however, when looking at the mixed marriages, the islands have five times 
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more mixed marriages than endogamous foreign marriages, after the islands 
follow the south, the north west, north east and at last, the center of the 
country. The percentage of mixed marriages from the total marriages, 
however, is higher in the northern regions of the country. 
This could indicate that the constraints in the local marriage market 
play an important role in these regions, the structural factors are differing in 
the different regions, probably the southern regions and islands set more 
limitations for finding someone from their own ethnic group at the moment 
of marriage and the foreigners opt for the natives. 
Figure 3 shows mixed marriages by country of origin from the 
minorities with the highest intermarriage rates by gender.  
It would be expected to see that when the group size of the 
immigrant is limited in the host country, the intermarriage rate is higher. 
Group size acts in two ways in the intermarriage decision, first as a 
constraint in the marriage market, and secondly as a third party influence.  
Religion plays also an important role in the intermarriage decision; 
therefore the intermarriage rate is expected to be higher for those countries 
with a common religion, particularly when the wife is the immigrant. Thus, 
conservative religions usually disadvise the mixed unions and to some 
extent might accept the union only for the male. The way religion influence 
the decision is also through third party influence, however, it is likely to 
have a great impact on the personal preferences. 
Countries which probably have a close culture and same religion are 
appearing in both, mixed marriages with Italian husband and Italian wife 
(Brazil, France, Germany, Cuba and Romania). Great parts of men that 
intermarry with an Italian spouse are from Muslim countries (Albania, 
Morocco, Egypt, Tunis and Senegal), as predicted; while women from 
Muslim countries do not really appear to marry Italian, with the exception 
of Morocco.  
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FIGURE 3: Marriages with at least one foreign spouse, main citizenships, year 2011, 
absolute values and percentages. 
Origin 
Country 
Italian husband Origin 
Country 
Foreign husband Origin 
Country 
Both spouses  
foreign wife Italian wife foreign 
 Absolute  %  Absolute  %  Absolute  % 
Value Value Value Value Value Value 
Romania 2,617 17.7 Morocco 320 10 Romania 864 18.8 
Ukraine 1,467 9.9 Albania 260 8.1 Nigeria 567 12.3 
Brazil 1,132 7.6 UK 234 7.3 China 526 11.4 
Russia 971 6.6 USA 155 4.8 Moldova 251 5.5 
Poland 947 6.4 Germania 152 4.7 Ukraine 213 4.6 
Moldova 699 4.7 Tunis 152 4.7 Peru 199 4.3 
Albania 619 4.2 France 150 4.7 Morocco 191 4.2 
Peru 390 2.6 Romania 140 4.4 Albania 179 3.9 
Morocco 357 2.4 Spain 117 3.6 Ireland 132 2.9 
Ecuador 279 1.9 Brazil 100 3.1 Ecuador 129 2.8 
Germania 267 1.8 Senegal 95 3 Ghana 113 2.5 
Cuba 258 1.7 Egypt 79 2.5 UK 90 2 
France 208 1.4 Cuba 59 1.8 Poland 73 1.6 
USA 205 1.4 Argentina 46 1.4 Cameron 68 1.5 
Dominican R. 198 1.3 Netherlands 44 1.4 Russia 65 1.4 
Other 4,185 28.4 Other 1,103 34.5 Other 940 20.3 
Total 14,799 100 Total 3,206 100 Total 4,600 100 
 
 
Source: Istat, Census 2011. http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/75517 
It seems surprising that the rates for both mixed marriages are quite 
different. In general the immigrant women intermarry at a highest rate, 
compared to men, e.g., Brazilian women intermarry 11 times more than 
Brazilian men, same for Albanian women, who intermarries more than 
twice as much as Albanian men, etc.  
When comparing endogamous and exogamous marriage (mixed 
marriages) rates, exogamous marriages are much higher, e.g., Romanian 
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women intermarry 2,617 and marries co ethnic partners 864, Peruvian 
women, 390 while marries co-ethnics 199. 
Individuals with the highest rate of endogamous marriage are many 
times from the biggest minorities, who probably have less constraints in the 
marriage market when finding a co-ethnic spouse, e.g. Romania, China, 
Moldova, Ukraine, etc. 
Figures show consistency with what is said in literature about 
intermarriages and its determinants. Alba and Golden (1986) concluded that 
the factors that influence a decision to marry are: group size, ancestry type 
and degree of ethnic relatedness. Further on intermarriages rate have a 
natural tendency to grow (Alba and Golden, 1986). 
5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used for the analysis comes from the Survey of Italian 
Family Income (Il Bilancio delle Famiglie Italiane). The survey contains 
information on the socio-economic position of the families living in Italy, 
every year of survey the number of interviewed families might vary, 
however the number is around 8,000 families and 20.000 individuals. The 
survey contains a subsample of panel, which in 2012 was composed by 
around 4,000 families; these families could have been interviewed in the 
previous or even earlier waves. The survey is distributed by the Italian 
Central Bank (Banca d’Italia).The survey is conducted every two years, 
since the 60s. The sample is randomly selected. For the interest of the 
analysis and for practical reasons, the sample includes the waves of the 
years 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012.  
The first year, when the Euro started being used as the official 
currency in Italy was the year 2002; the questionnaires are presenting 
information on Italian Lire, previous to the year. The starting year in the 
analysis is 2004, since after the euro started being used as the official 
currency it is cautious to expect that prices and salaries suffer adjustments. 
This preventive measure might help avoiding a bias of adjustments, at the 
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price of losing some observations.  A further practical reason for the chosen 
years of analysis is that the questionnaires are consistently more 
homogeneous in recent years, presenting more similarities in the variables, 
thus this simplifies the procedure in the analysis while also making it more 
comparable among the different years. Finally, and most importantly, Italy 
is a relatively young country of immigration and therefore it makes more 
sense that intermarriage, and of course, economic integration might occur in 
more recent years.  
The analysis focuses only on salary earners. In order to restrict the 
sample to individuals in a working age, individuals older than 65 years and 
younger than 15 years were excluded; individuals without a salary income 
were also excluded from the analysis. For the aim of this analysis, 
observations that arrived for a family reason, which is assumed to be a 
family reunification were erased from the sample, in this way we can 
assume the individuals decided to marry after migrating, the cost of this 
exclusion of observations diminish the sample by 197 observations, most of 
them being women. 
The sample in the descriptive part is kept in a high number, 
compared to the econometric analysis. The main reason for that is that I 
believe the comparison of endogamously married and intermarried 
immigrants with the natives might gave some important hints on the gaps 
and integration of immigrants; when economic integration is intended as 
diminishing the gap between immigrants and the natives, the outcomes in 
the labor market and the human capital bundles of the native should act as a 
benchmark for the economic integration of immigrants, therefore, even 
though most of the studies analyzing intermarriage premium do not present 
comparisons with the natives; a comparison is provided in this thesis. 
The sample is composed by 28,560 observations, of which 8.3% are 
immigrants; of the 2,367 observations 1,074 are endogamous married while 
1,204 are exogamous married. 89 are never married immigrants, the number 
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of the never married might appear small, and however, since only 
individuals with salary are considered it shall not be surprising. 
Figure 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the male, by type of 
marriage.  
FIGURE 4 
Descriptive Statistics Male Sample 
 
 Total Sample Endogamous 
Marriage 
Exogamous 
Marriage 
Native-
Endogamous 
Marriage 
     
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
         
Wage 19003.5 9693.3 15490 6427.9 17273.7 9517.8 19399.9 9839.5 
Age 45.97 9 41.09 8.19 42.82 9.55 46.58 8.85 
Educational Level        
Primary (%) 7.44  7.11  6.24  7.56  
Secondary 
(%) 
78.88  81.01  84.65  78.27  
Tertiary (%) 11.94  8.79  7.91  12.49  
Postgraduate 
(%) 
1.12  1.55  0.36  1.15  
Migration information       
Age at 
migration 
28.45 8.2 28.96 7.38 27.4 9.62 
 
  
Years since 
migration 
11.52 7.9 11.73 6.47 11.10 10.25   
Italian 
proficiency 
        
Expressing in 
Italian 
8.35 1.53 7.45 1.6 7.89 1.74 8.53 1.43 
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The earnings were calculated as the net yearly earnings, for 
comparative reasons and in order to take into account the productivity the 
resulting earnings were divided by the average of weekly hours worked in a 
year.  
The average earnings are higher for native endogamous marriages, 
followed by intermarried immigrants and the lowest average earnings 
correspond to the endogamously married immigrants. Secondly, 
intermarried and endogamously married lag behind in terms of tertiary 
education when compared to the native sample. 
However when the post graduate education is considered, 
endogamously married have the highest percentage. Thirdly, the average 
years since migration are surprisingly higher for those who are 
endogamously married, however the standard deviation is almost doubled in 
the intermarried group and the difference in the average years since arrival 
between the two groups is not so significant. Lastly, before the conclusions 
on language proficiency of the sample it is due to have some clarifications. 
Language ability or proficiency is a subjective question which is answered 
by the interviewers who judge the speaking skills capability in Italian 
language of the interviewed; the scale goes from a maximum of ten and a 
minimum of zero. The question was answered also by the natives. It can be 
argued that this is a subjective measure and it might be based on the way the 
questions were answered, which could be influenced by feelings at the same 
time influenced by the questions. However, it is the only measure for 
speaking skills present in the questionnaire. Additionally, this could 
probably measure communication skills and not solely the language 
proficiency.  
As expected, intermarried individuals have better language skills 
than endogamously married, while natives have the highest record. 
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Figure 5, presents the female sample descriptive statistics. In 
coherence with the male sample, the average earnings are the highest for the 
native group, followed by the intermarried immigrants and the lowest 
average earnings are verified in the endogamously married group. Secondly, 
                     FIGURE 5 
Descriptive Statistics Female Sample 
 
 Total Sample Endogamous 
Marriage 
Exogamous 
Marriage 
Native-
Endogamous 
Marriage 
     
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
         
Wage 14544.1 6989.15 9891.31 5517.45 12535 6675.5 14931.11 6970.11 
Age 44.76 8.84 38.3 9.08 42.83 8.67 46.58 8.85 
Educational Level        
Primary (%) 4.71  6.51  7.47  5.35  
Secondary 
(%) 
75.90  86.55  80.84  82.48  
Tertiary (%) 18.32  5.64  8.42  11.19  
Postgraduate 
(%) 
0.83  1.3  1.63  0.73  
Migration information        
Age at 
migration 
29.81 10.46 27.93 8.42 31.37 11.68   
Years since 
migration 
10.64 8.912 9.95 6.5 11.21 10.5   
Italian proficiency        
Expressing 
in Italian 
8.55 1.43 7.75 1.52 7.9 1.81 8.71 1.31 
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there is a substantial difference in the average age of four years between the 
endogamous and exogamous groups, being the former the youngest. In 
terms of education, the native group has the highest percentage of 
individuals with tertiary education, followed by the intermarried group and 
at last the endogamously married group. The percentage of individuals with 
post graduate studies is the highest for the exogamous married, followed by 
the endogamously married; surprisingly the natives are situated at last. The 
age at migration is higher for the exogamous married group. Years since 
migration, in accordance with the literature are higher for the exogamous 
married. The language proficiency is higher for the natives, followed by the 
intermarried and at last the endogamously married. The difference between 
the two, however, is not high. 
When comparing the male to the female sample, it is noticeable that 
women have higher language ability and to some extent higher tertiary 
education rates, however the earnings appear lower than the indicated in th 
male sample. 
The bank restrict the distribution of information on country of 
origin, and agreed to furnish this information in aggregated groups, with 
enough numerosity to protect the privacy of the interviewed. Therefore, 
ethnic groups were divided considering the proximity to Italian language 
and, as Helgertz (2013) and in one case the economy of the origin country 
(as high income or low income). Four groups were created, their 
formulation is explained in the variables subsection, in the methodology 
section. 
The group with the highest rate of intermarriage is the group with 
Germanic languages. Followed by the group with Latin language roots, 
surprisingly, the group that follows is the one most distant, without a Latin 
script, and at last the group with medium distance, with Latin alphabet but 
not Latin roots in the language. Literature has many times outlined that 
intermarrying might depend on the proximity of the culture/language, 
therefore this might seem surprising, even the group without a Latin 
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alphabet which is expected to have the lowest rate due to the probability of 
having more traditionalist religions that do not recommend unions with 
other religions, are not the last. However, this can be explained by the group 
size, which is the biggest for the Latin group, therefore it is expected a 
lower rate of intermarriage, followed by the most distant group, without a 
Latin alphabet, afterwards the group with medium distance, common 
alphabet and at last is found the group with Germanic languages, which is 
also the group with the highest rate of intermarriages.  
It worth highlighting that since group size is not perfectly identified 
and only the language proximity is used as a proxy for it. Language distance 
has been identified as one of the ultimate factors that influence positively 
intermarriage, confirmed by the work of Lucassen and Laarman (2009). 
5.1. Pitfalls and limitations of the data 
  
Wages are observed only for those immigrants that are actually 
working, in fact, the most unsuccessful marriages of co-ethnically married 
immigrants might return home while the intermarried immigrants might stay 
in the hosting country. The sample is positively selected since those who 
fail to have a salary are excluded from the analysis. Therefore validity of the 
analysis remains internal. 
The moment when the marriage occurred is not observed. Therefore, 
it is not observed if the individuals married after migrating. It is assumed 
that individuals who migrated for a family reason were married before 
migrating and these individuals were excluded from the sample. There 
remains in the sample only immigrants who declared to have migrated for 
job or other reasons. 
 It worth mentioning that given the methodology for this analysis, 
the most appropriate dataset would be a cross sectional set. The available 
data is a pool of cross sections with a subsample of panel.  The analysis 
relies in the fact that the sample is randomly selected. 
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Further on, many examples of analysis include information on 
number of children. The information is not available in the questionnaire; 
therefore it is not included in the regression. 
 
6. Analytical Strategy 
 
6.1.  Econometric Framework  
The hypothesis in question is to determine whether intermarried 
immigrants have better outcomes in the labor market, compared to the 
endogamously married. In order to estimate the effect of intermarriage on 
earnings, the equation employed for the analysis will be the Mincerian 
equation of earnings (Mincer 1974): 
 
(1)                                 𝑙n𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖=𝛽0+𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑+ X’2 𝛽2+𝜀𝑖                      
 
Where, lnWage is the natural logarithm of the yearly salary earnings 
divided by the average weekly hours worked. Intermarried is the variable of 
interest, which is a dichotomic variable, equaling 1 when an individual is 
intermarried and 0 otherwise, 𝛽1 is the coefficient of interest and constitutes 
the intermarriage premium. X’2 includes all the other covariates that 
determine earnings, explained in the variables subsection.  
It must be highlighted that intermarry is not exogenous.  
Intermarriage is not a random event and it occurs based on unobservable 
that are correlated to the dependent variable.  
Unobservable variables that are valued in the marriage market are 
also valued in the labor market. These skills can be ambition, physical 
appearance, communications skills or knowledge of the local customs 
(Kantarevic, 2005). Estimating the earnings equation without taking into 
account the endogeneity of intermarriage would bias the OLS estimates. 
In order to take into account the endogeneity of intermarriage, the 
methodologies used in the literature are mainly fixed effects and 
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instrumental variables, however individual fixed effects compares never 
married to intermarried individuals and the estimates might not deliver the 
coefficient of interest, since it is commonly known in literature that the act 
of marrying has a positive effect on earnings, therefore, this procedure 
might overvalued the effect of intermarriage.  
The first step in literature when estimating the intermarriage 
premium is to estimate an ordinary least squares regression, which delivers 
the raw premium and tests the Productivity Hypothesis. The following step 
is to analyze whether the intermarried are positively/negatively selected into 
intermarriage. This part of the procedure requires adopting a methodology 
that accounts for endogeneity of intermarriage. The methodology adopted in 
this work is instrumental variables which account for the endogeneity of 
intermarriage. 
6.2. The variables 
In order to endogenize the intermarriage variable, first it is needed to 
identify possible factors that might affect the decision to intermarry. In 
literature, there are mainly three factors that affect the marrying decision. 
First, individual preferences; second, the influence of third parties and third, 
constrains of the marriage market (Kalmijn, 1998). The instruments 
commonly used in literature are given by sex ratio that is the number of 
group members of the opposite sex divided by the group members of the 
same sex (Gevrek, 2009). However, in order to be a valid instrument the 
variable should respect two assumptions. First it should be correlated with 
the interest variable and second, it should not be correlated to the dependent 
variable. 
The instrument sex ratio is reflecting the marriage market constraint 
as it captures the competition for a spouse from the same ethnic group in the 
local marriage market. A smaller ratio indicates higher competition for 
marrying some one of the same ethnic group. In the same manner, a lower 
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ratio indicates that the probability to marrying endogamously is higher. This 
is the local marriage market constrain. 
 
(2)                                            𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑚 =
𝑁𝑓
𝑗
𝑁𝑚
𝑗  
Formula (2) and (3) indicate sex ratio, where N indicates the number of 
individuals, from the cell j of ethnic group in a specific region, of gender m 
(male) or f (female). 
(3)                                           𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑓 =
𝑁𝑚
𝑗
𝑁𝑓
𝑗  
In order for the sex ratio to be an appropriate instrument for 
intermarriage it should respect the two assumptions. First a correlation with 
the variable of interest and secondly it should not be correlated with the 
dependent variable (or any of its other determinants), that is the exclusion 
restriction. 
Sex ratio reflects the relative group size of a gender in the same 
ethnic group. The first assumption seems respected since the competition in 
the local marriage market is likely to affect the intermarrying decision 
positively.  
The second assumption is that it should not be correlated to the 
dependent variable. There are not obvious reasons to think that this 
assumption is not respected. Therefore, sex ratio seems to be an appropriate 
instrument for the intermarriage variable. 
(4)                                          𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑚 =
𝑁𝑓
𝑗
𝑁𝑓
 
Formula (4) and (5) indicate the group size, or the probability for 
endogamous marriage, where N indicates the number of individuals, from 
the cell j of a specific ethnic group in a specific region, of gender m (male) 
or f (female). 
(5)                                           𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑓 =
𝑁𝑚
𝑗
𝑁𝑚
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The second instrument is given by the group size, which is the 
number of immigrants of the opposite sex relative to the whole population 
of the opposite sex (Gevrek, 2009). The logic of this instrument is that the 
higher the ratio, the higher the probabilities of marrying someone from the 
same ethnic group. This instrument is acting from two sides, one is the local 
marriage market constraint reflected by the ratio, second, the third party 
influence, a larger number of members from its own group might indicate 
more influence of third parties in the marriage decision, however this might 
also depend on the religion of the ethnic group and on how familistic is their 
culture. 
When the two assumptions are considered for the instrument, group 
size i.e., the instrument must be correlated with intermarriage but 
uncorrelated to earnings. The exclusion restriction might not be convincing. 
Since when the local marriage market is composed by mainly individuals 
from the same country of origin as the immigrant, it might still have an 
impact on their salary. A higher number of group members from the same 
ethnic group might indeed have a positive effect on the earnings of the 
immigrant, this through a network or because bigger groups are more 
assimilated in host societies. Therefore the exclusion restriction for the 
instrument of group size is doubtful.  
The instrument used in this exercise is the sex ratio since there are 
not reasons to think the exclusion restriction is not respected and a 
correlation with intermarriage is logic. 
One of the instruments traditionally used in the literature when 
considering intermarriage as endogenous is the sex ratio. However there are 
two strong assumptions that are taken into account, given the structure of 
the dataset. The first one is that the sex ratio over the whole country is the 
same; this assumption to my advice presents some weaknesses, since it is 
more likely that groups of immigrants, from the same origin concentrate in 
specific areas of the country. The second assumption is that the sex ratio is 
the same in the time of the survey is the same at the time of marriage. 
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These assumptions are considered when lack of information of 
structural factors is missing.  
The instrument, sex ratio has been formulated as the individuals of 
the opposite sex from the same group, the defined by the linguistic distance, 
over the individuals from the same sex, in the same group. This is to 
indicate the competition in the marriage market and the logic behind is that 
the higher the ratio the more the probabilities that a person marries someone 
from the same group of origin. As stated previously, literature traditionally 
assumes that the sex ratio is the same all over the country. However in the 
dataset in use it has been evidenced that there are different concentration of 
immigrants from different groups per area, therefore, in this case the 
instrument has been formulated taking into account the area of residence of 
every individual. Where five areas have been defined: The first area is the 
north east; the second are is the North West; a third area is the center; a 
fourth is the south of Italy and by last the islands composed the fifth area.  
It might be argued that individuals do not face the same structural 
factors when marrying; therefore it would be optimum to observe the 
moment of marriage and assign the sex ratio at the moment of marriage. The 
biggest difficulty is in distinguishing individuals who arrived being married, 
since this could bias the estimates, since the structural factors in the origin 
country are certainly different from those found in the host country. This 
information is not available in the dataset. However, according to figures 
from the United Nations, age at first marriage in Italy in 2011 is 33.8 for 
men and 30.8 for women (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe "Mean age at first marriage by sex", accessed the 21st May 2015), 
while the average age at migration is around 25 years. This might not 
directly indicate that people who marry are exposed to the same structural 
factors, however it might diminish part of the weakness, in the instrument. 
Further on, according to the dataset in use, only 15% of the individuals who 
indicated a reason of entry have declared a family reunification as the 
reason of arrival into the country, while the 82% declared to have migrated 
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for job reasons. Individuals who entered the country for family reasons were 
excluded from the sample, at the cost of reducing the observations. 
Even if information of moment of marriage was available 
relationships usually start many years before marriage, therefore, the 
assumption that structural factors being the same for everyone at the 
moment of marriage, even if still valid might not perfectly hold. 
However, given the restrictions of the available information, it has 
been attributed that the structural factors in the marriage market were the 
same at the moment of the survey and at the moment of the marriage.  
The dependent variable, the natural logarithm of wages, has been 
obtained using information on net, annual salary earnings and on 
information of average weekly working hours. Wages have been divided in 
average weekly hours worked, applying the natural logarithm, afterwards. In 
this way, the earnings are taking into account differences in hours worked 
that might among the individuals. 
 The traditional variables included in the equation of earnings are: 
education (edu), experience, where age is used as a proxy. Because of the 
functional form it also includes the quadratic term of age (age2) (Mincer, 
1974) 
The variable indicating the degree of education has been obtained 
aggregating the information of studies of the individuals in the questionnaire 
into 4 categories, the variable is increasing, in this way the variable equals 1 
if the individual has only a degree of primary school or if the individual has 
not obtained any degree of education; the variable equals 2 when the 
individual has only a secondary degree. In this category have been included 
individuals with a technique degree, which degree however requires a total 
of 12 years of schooling. A third category is composed by individuals with a 
Bachelor degree and a last group includes individuals with postgraduate 
studies. No information on individuals with higher degrees has been 
provided in the questionnaires. 
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The other covariates have been formulated as follows: 
The variable for identifying immigrants has been obtained in first 
place exploiting the place of birth, in this way when a person is born abroad 
is considered an immigrant. The questionnaire contains information on 
citizenship, however this information has not been used to identify 
immigrants, because the law in Italy allows for who has an Italian ancestor 
to obtain the Italian citizenship, in this way many immigrants do have the 
Italian citizenship.  
A further criteria to distinguish foreigners is the information on year 
of arrival, in this way when someone has provided information on year of 
arrival to the country, the individual has been included in the immigrants 
group. 
A dummy variable to capture the year effect have been generated for 
each year of study, that is, for each year where the questionnaire has been 
conducted. And a dummy that captures the effect of the crisis, in this way 
the variable equals one if the year is 2002, 2004 or 2006 and zero otherwise. 
The intermarriages variable is a dichotomic variable equaling one 
when the individual is intermarried and zero otherwise, this one is present 
only for the foreign born. In order to compare the outcomes a variable for 
foreigners that are endogamously married has been calculated, the latter is a 
dichotomic variable, which is one for individuals that are endogamously 
married and zero otherwise. The variable for natives who are endogamously 
married is a dummy variable equaling one when a native is endogamously 
married and zero otherwise, this was calculated to compare the different 
outcomes on earnings. 
In order to isolate any effect on obtaining the Italian citizenship on 
earnings, a variable indicating  when an individual possesses the Italian 
citizenship has been calculated, the latter is a dummy variable equaling one 
when the individual possesses the Italian citizenship and zero otherwise. 
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The variable indicating the years since migration has been created 
subtracting the year of arrival to the year when the survey was conducted. 
The drawback of this variable is that only a small portion of the individuals 
have actually answered. A total of 1,436 individuals have provided 
information on year of arrival, which reduces the sample dramatically on the 
regressions.  
The Central Bank of Italy restricts the distribution on information 
about place of birth. However, the bank accepted to provide information on 
place of birth when grouping the observations in a maximum of 4 groups. In 
this way 4 groups were created, in a way to exploit the group effect and the 
linguistic distance. In this manner, a group has been created for individuals 
born in a country which official language or language mostly diffused has  
the highest proximity to the Italian language, that is, countries with an 
official language that presents Latin roots, this group contains most of the 
countries in Latin America, some countries in Africa and in the Southern 
Europe. A second group, with a medium proximity to Italian language has 
been created for individuals born in a country where a Latin alphabet is in 
official use, but the where the official language has no Latin roots. In order 
to exploit the group effect this group has been divided into two subgroups, a 
first one with countries with higher income and a second group, with 
countries presenting lower income. The subgroup of individuals with higher 
income countries is mainly composed by countries with Germanic 
languages, from Northern Europe, Oceania and America, countries with 
typically high income (GDP). The second subgroup is composed by all the 
other countries that do not have official languages with Latin roots, but 
where the Latin alphabet is still in use, most of these countries are from 
Eastern Europe, Caribbean and Africa, countries with typically lower 
income compared to the Germanic ones. 
A third group was composed with individuals coming from countries 
where a Latin alphabet is not in use and the language presents the least 
proximity to the Italian language, the individuals in this group come mainly 
from Asia and East Europe.  
  
 40 
 
Four different dummy variables have been created to distinguish the 
four different groups, the dummies are 1 when the individual is belonging to 
that specific group and zero otherwise.  
Finally, a variable to distinguish the linguistic distance from the 
official language to the Italian language has been created. This variable 
takes into account the official languages in the country of birth or the widely 
diffused languages when an official language has not been formally 
recognized. When an immigrant comes from a country that has more than 
one official language, the individual has been placed in the group with the 
language with highest proximity to Italian, since it might be more likely that 
the individual decides to migrate to Italy when he is more knowledgeable of 
a language closer to the Italian. The procedure on creating this variable has 
followed the guidelines of Helgertz, J., (2013) when the author analyzed the 
effect of the linguistic distance of immigrants’ language knowledge to the 
Swedish language. The variable of linguistic distance has 3 scales, it equals 
1 when the official language has Latin roots indicates more proximity, it 
equals 2 when the official language has not Latin roots, but a Latin alphabet 
is in use, indicating medium proximity and finally the variable equals 3 
when the official language in the country of birth has not Latin roots and 
Latin alphabet is not on use, this indicates less proximity to Italian language. 
The variable linguistic distance, measures i) the linguistic distance to 
Italian language and ii) the ethnic relatedness. Given the availability of 
information and the number of observations linguistic distance groups 
individuals in three categories: i) Low linguistic distance (High ethnic 
relatedness); ii) Medium linguistic distance (Medium ethnic relatedness) 
and iii) High linguistic distance (Low ethnic relatedness). 
Contrary to some examples of literature (e.g., Meng & Meurs, 
2009), A regression that models the determinants of intermarriage has not 
been estimated. The reason is that it is not easy to distinguish which 
variables could determine intermarriage which has not an effect on marriage 
at the same time (Gevrek, 2009). 
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7. Results 
 
The first regression gives the results of traditional variables used in 
the Mincer (1974) equation; additionally to the effect of being an immigrant 
in Italy, the equations include also a variable controlling for language 
ability, which is present also for the natives. Equation 1 in table 1 shows 
that the coefficients of variables education, age (as a proxy of experience) 
and language are positive and significant, as expected. The coefficient of the 
immigrant variable is negative and significant; it indicates that in average an 
immigrant earns around 13% less than a native, even after controlling for 
education, experience, language ability and the gender effect.  
When considering the effect of being an immigrant separately for 
man and women in equation 2 and 3, respectively. It is found that the effect 
of being a female immigrant is even more penalizing, since it is associated 
with an 18% of fewer earnings compared to a native woman, after 
controlling for traditional variables and language ability. The effect of being 
a male immigrant penalizes earnings by around 10%. Traditional variables 
and language are positive and significant also for the male. These results 
could be interpreted in several ways. First immigrants’ human capital could 
suffer devaluation and not be recognized; the human capital acquired in the 
country of origin could not correspond to the host country needs. It is 
argued in literature that at the moment of arrival, the human capital is 
devalued and a revaluation can occur only upon the adjustment of language 
proficiency, a better knowledge of local job searching strategies, and upon 
other events which are part of the economic integration in the host society. 
Therefore, it could also be that the process of economic integration could 
not have been maturated yet. Furtherly, the position of immigrants could lag 
behind respect to natives in the labor market in non-observable ways; 
therefore this result could be determined by unobservable variables.  
Another possible reason is that there could be discrimination against 
the immigrants in the labor market, in a survey conducted by the 
commission of integration of immigrants 16% of respondents declared that 
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would not hire an immigrant if they should hire someone (Allasino, 
Reyneri, Venturini & Zincone, 2004). 
However, according to the segmentation theory, assimilation could 
vary across ethnic groups, therefore, in order to analyze if this effect could 
be due to the ethnic relatedness, in the next test; the variable for linguistic 
distance is included, capturing the effect separately for men and women. 
The coefficient of the immigrant variable is still negative, and however, it 
loses significance in the male and female sample. The coefficient of 
linguistic distance is significant in the female sample, while in the male 
sample it is negative but not significant. The effect of linguistic distance 
outweighs the effect of being an immigrant in the female sample (in 
equation 5). Therefore it is found that the negative effect of being an 
immigrant, for a woman, could be associated to the linguistic distance, or 
ethnic relatedness. 
 
TABLE 1: Immigrant effect   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLE Full sample Only male Only female With ling dist 
male 
With ling dist 
female 
      
edu 0.307*** 0.293*** 0.324*** 0.264*** 0.296*** 
 (0.00942) (0.0127) (0.0141) (0.0169) (0.0187) 
age 0.0621*** 0.0604*** 0.0641*** 0.0591*** 0.0712*** 
 (0.00313) (0.00399) (0.00505) (0.00537) (0.00674) 
agesq -
0.000540*** 
-
0.000533*** 
-
0.000545*** 
-0.000514*** -0.000626*** 
 (3.73e-05) (4.75e-05) (6.01e-05) (6.43e-05) (8.06e-05) 
frg -0.137*** -0.106*** -0.185*** -0.0822* -0.0883 
 (0.0134) (0.0173) (0.0213) (0.0443) (0.0563) 
sex 0.125***     
 (0.00946)     
ita 0.0282*** 0.0263*** 0.0322*** 0.0283*** 0.0242*** 
 (0.00328) (0.00423) (0.00520) (0.00552) (0.00674) 
ling_dist    -0.00850 -0.0714** 
    (0.0222) (0.0284) 
Constant 3.439*** 3.658*** 3.296*** 3.716*** 3.286*** 
 (0.0700) (0.0881) (0.112) (0.118) (0.147) 
      
Observations 11,796 6,694 5,102 3,834 2,853 
R-squared 0.223 0.209 0.237 0.198 0.240 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The result of these regressions is not the main objective of this 
thesis, but it might give significant hints on the fact that there is still a long 
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way to go for the process of integration of immigrants in Italy, particularly 
for those whose language and culture is more distant to the natives. 
The hypothesis is that intermarriage accelerates the process of 
integration, through a positive effect on earnings. 
 
 
TABLE 2: Raw intermarriage premium, full sample 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
edu 0.127*** 0.142*** 0.138*** 0.137*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0291) (0.0292) (0.0292) 
age 0.0579*** 0.0553*** 0.0556*** 0.0558*** 
 (0.00947) (0.00937) (0.00933) (0.00934) 
agesq -0.000627*** -0.000585*** -0.000584*** -0.000585*** 
 (0.000119) (0.000118) (0.000117) (0.000117) 
ysm 0.00573*** 0.00494*** 0.00575*** 0.00576*** 
 (0.00175) (0.00173) (0.00176) (0.00182) 
im -0.0587** -0.0134 -0.00549 -0.0774 
 (0.0268) (0.0276) (0.0275) (0.0716) 
sex  0.167*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 
  (0.0287) (0.0286) (0.0287) 
ita 0.0161* 0.0216*** 0.0253*** 0.0256*** 
 (0.00837) (0.00832) (0.00839) (0.00842) 
bc   0.0971** 0.130*** 
   (0.0380) (0.0480) 
north   0.107*** 0.108*** 
   (0.0292) (0.0292) 
d1   0.00458 0.00562 
   (0.0321) (0.0321) 
d2   0.00537 0.00479 
   (0.0424) (0.0425) 
d3   -0.0255 -0.0253 
   (0.0386) (0.0386) 
im3    0.0953 
    (0.0859) 
im4    0.0869 
    (0.0835) 
im5    0.0758 
    (0.0799) 
Constant 4.068*** 3.915*** 3.792*** 3.781*** 
 (0.198) (0.197) (0.200) (0.201) 
     
Observations 1,409 1,409 1,409 1,409 
R-squared 0.082 0.104 0.118 0.119 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
In order to analyze the solely intermarriage effect and control for 
other variables that are positively associated with economic integration of 
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the immigrants. Table 2 presents the estimates. The first equation, model 1, 
indicate a small coefficient of the variable intermarried, negative and 
significant only at the 5%, however when the variable sex is included 
(model 2), the variable loses significance, meaning that the gender effect 
outweighs the intermarriage effect. Model 3 includes group dummies, 
controlling for ethnic group effect, however none of these variables are 
significant. Interactions that capture the effect of intermarriage per year 
have been included in model 4, in order to control for a variation in the 
returns to the specific skills acquired with intermarriage. However, none of 
these are significant and heir coefficients appear negative. The variables: 
education, age, sex, years since migration and language are positive and 
significant in all the equations of table 2 having also the expected sign. 
Table 3 presents the regression, splitting the sample in high earnings 
and low earnings further on the sample is divided also per gender. In this 
way is possible to disentangle the effect of intermarriage. 
The sample with higher earnings (1), the variables, sex and years 
since migration have a positive effect and significant, while the variables 
age and intermarried are negative and non-significant.  
The regression for the sample with lower earnings (2) has different 
results.  
The variable education is positive and significant only for the high 
earnings sample, particularly accentuated for the males, and positive but not 
significant for the females with high earnings, furtherly, it is observed that 
the variable years since migration is positive and significant in all the 
equations for the samples with high earnings, this could be interpreted as a 
result of the assimilation i.e., revaluation of the human capital of the 
immigrant. The age variable has a negative sign and it is not significant, the 
intermarriage variable has a negative sign for male and for the full sample 
with high earnings. 
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The low earnings sample show that age effect is negative and 
particularly accentuated for female, while for male is not positive and 
neither significant. The intermarriage variable appears positive but not 
significant for all the equations of the low earnings sample. 
 
TABLE 3: Intermarriage premium per income and gender   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES High 
earnings 
Low 
earnings 
Male high 
earnings 
Female high 
earnings 
Male low 
earnings 
Female low 
earnings 
       
edu 0.110*** 0.0702 0.116*** 0.0699 0.0371 0.0867 
 (0.0197) (0.0481) (0.0205) (0.0556) (0.0827) (0.0584) 
age -0.00488 0.0413*** -0.00516 -0.00428 0.0352 0.0494*** 
 (0.00790) (0.0135) (0.00815) (0.0259) (0.0215) (0.0176) 
agesq 0.000112 -
0.000461*** 
0.000107 0.000130 -0.000416 -0.000540** 
 (9.74e-05) (0.000171) (0.000102) (0.000302) (0.000279) (0.000219) 
sex 0.0712*** -0.148***     
 (0.0255) (0.0438)     
ysm 0.00667*** 0.00386 0.00651*** 0.00662*** 0.00281 0.00550 
 (0.00120) (0.00285) (0.00150) (0.00229) (0.00464) (0.00365) 
im -0.00359 0.0476 -0.0202 0.0629 0.0360 0.0446 
 (0.0206) (0.0432) (0.0215) (0.0624) (0.0717) (0.0544) 
Constant 5.655*** 4.432*** 5.738*** 5.634*** 4.523*** 4.196*** 
 (0.167) (0.279) (0.168) (0.541) (0.436) (0.358) 
       
Observations 741 695 592 149 294 401 
R-squared 0.136 0.055 0.135 0.153 0.015 0.054 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In order to identify an effect that might be differing among the 
groups Table 4 shows the regressions when the sample is divided by ethnic 
group (linguistic distance) and when possible by income of the origin 
country. Non significance is found for intermarriage premium and the sign 
of the coefficient for the groups is negative, except by the group with 
medium linguistic distance and low income, where it is positive but not 
significant. Education, age and sex are positive and significant for low and 
high distance groups. The variable years since migration is significant only 
for the high distance group. In the same manner language is important only 
for the low distance group. 
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TABLE 4: intermarriage effect per ethnic group 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Low ling dist Med ling dist High ling dist  
    
edu 0.148*** 0.0470 0.161*** 
 (0.0481) (0.0927) (0.0607) 
age 0.0780*** 0.0316 0.0679*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0221) (0.0199) 
agesq -0.000883*** -0.000317 -0.000725*** 
 (0.000213) (0.000284) (0.000248) 
sex 0.185*** 0.141* 0.273*** 
 (0.0469) (0.0730) (0.0699) 
ysm 0.00336 0.00468 0.00984* 
 (0.00334) (0.00608) (0.00503) 
im -0.00431 -0.00572 0.0621 
 (0.0448) (0.0706) (0.0698) 
ita 0.0273** -0.0178 0.0199 
 (0.0132) (0.0195) (0.0178) 
Constant 3.456*** 4.902*** 3.442*** 
 (0.344) (0.478) (0.437) 
    
Observations 491 190 255 
R-squared 0.121 0.068 0.176 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The variable intermarriage is not significant even when the sample is 
furtherly divided per group and gender. Further on, in this case most of the 
traditional variables lose significance, probably due to the fact that the 
observations in some groups decreased. 
 
TABLE 5: Intermarriage per group and gender 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Low ling 
dist male 
Low ling 
dist female 
Med ling 
dist male 
Med ling 
dist female 
High ling 
dist male 
High ling 
dist female 
       
edu 0.151** 0.0793 0.101 -0.0252 0.182** 0.132 
 (0.0587) (0.0856) (0.118) (0.152) (0.0820) (0.0895) 
age 0.0781*** 0.0482 0.0287 0.0284 0.0169 0.145*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0309) (0.0275) (0.0385) (0.0268) (0.0304) 
agesq -
0.000881*** 
-0.000506 -0.000269 -0.000306 -5.29e-05 -
0.00166*** 
 (0.000254) (0.000404) (0.000353) (0.000494) (0.000349) (0.000362) 
ysm -0.00130 0.0152** 0.00371 0.00262 0.00616 0.00736 
 (0.00414) (0.00594) (0.00776) (0.0100) (0.00690) (0.00764) 
im -0.0497 0.112 -0.0893 0.149 0.0331 0.0643 
 (0.0567) (0.0768) (0.0924) (0.115) (0.0891) (0.111) 
ita 0.0497*** -0.00782 -0.0336 0.00692 0.00175 0.0446 
 (0.0168) (0.0212) (0.0273) (0.0284) (0.0230) (0.0285) 
Constant 3.529*** 4.247*** 5.118*** 4.900*** 4.758*** 1.842*** 
 (0.424) (0.604) (0.607) (0.772) (0.573) (0.655) 
       
Observations 311 180 127 63 159 96 
R-squared 0.121 0.129 0.066 0.069 0.130 0.283 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6, shows the results of the estimations when the sample is 
divided per ethnic group (linguistic distance), gender and by educational 
level.  
After dividing the sample by group, gender and educational level 
there is found a positive and significant effect of intermarriage on the 
earnings of individuals from countries where the linguistic distance is the 
largest, where individuals have potentially higher benefits when marrying a 
native, who have higher education, the results are reported in Table 6. The 
effect of intermarriage in the individuals outweigh the effect of traditional 
variables such as education and experience, (experience is significant in the 
equation 2 at the 10%), at the same way years since migration is significant 
only in equation 2 at the 5% of significance level and the language is not 
significant in any of the equations, the sign of the language variable appears 
negative for the female sample. 
 
TABLE 6: Intermarriage per group, education and gender 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES High ling. dist high edu  
male and female 
High ling. dist high 
edu male 
High ling dist high 
edu male 
    
edu 0.668 0.643 0.731 
 (0.419) (0.538) (0.611) 
age 0.212* 0.155 0.194 
 (0.114) (0.315) (0.346) 
agesq -0.00244* -0.00121 -0.00169 
 (0.00132) (0.00376) (0.00416) 
ysm 0.0415** 0.00107 0.00306 
 (0.0156) (0.0390) (0.0414) 
im 0.464** 1.287** 1.168* 
 (0.225) (0.439) (0.560) 
ita 0.0351 -0.151 -0.122 
 (0.0514) (0.225) (0.249) 
north   -0.162 
   (0.426) 
Constant -1.556 0.583 -0.535 
 (3.158) (8.988) (9.899) 
    
Observations 37 16 16 
R-squared 0.371 0.669 0.675 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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From the sample in equations 1, from Table 6, 21 individuals out of 
37 are intermarried. Considering the male sample equation 2 of the same 
Table, 4 individuals out of 16 are intermarried. 
Further on, in the next equation the variable intermarriage is 
considered as endogenous, the equation and includes the instrument sex 
ratio in the regression. The results of Table 7 show a decrease in the 
coefficient of the variable intermarriage for the full sample, in equation 1. 
This might indicate a positive selection into intermarriage. When considered 
the sample with high linguistic distance and high education the coefficient 
of intermarriage increases, indicating a negative selection into intermarriage 
of the subgroup.  
Negative selection indicates that the unobserved factors that might 
be correlated to the labor and marriage market are negatively correlated to 
the marriage and labor market. 
 
  
TABLE 7: Instrumental variables estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full sample High dist led High dist led m 
    
im -0.420*** 1.947 2.962 
 (0.154) (2.949) (5.040) 
edu 0.130*** 0.794 0.729 
 (0.0358) (0.683) (0.701) 
age 0.0620*** 0.482 -0.0777 
 (0.0119) (0.599) (0.794) 
agesq -0.000655*** -0.00561 0.00215 
 (0.000152) (0.00710) (0.0110) 
ysm 0.00509** 0.0795 -0.0486 
 (0.00241) (0.0879) (0.156) 
ita 0.0151 0.0444 -0.539 
 (0.00999) (0.0810) (1.194) 
sex  0.698  
  (1.019)  
Constant 4.128*** -8.998 7.311 
 (0.255) (16.72) (22.90) 
    
Observations 970 37 16 
R-squared   0.134 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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8. Discussion 
 
This result might be somewhat surprising when the theory of Becker 
is considered, since The Productivity Hypothesis argues that though 
specialization and the division of labor within the family, the man can 
accumulate more human capital (Becker 1973). Since, probably 
endogamous families with largest distance to Italian language have a more 
rigid division of labor within the family, this can be outweigh only by the 
credit constraint theory, in which mixed families allows a male to 
accumulate human capital, which entails a positive effect on the labor 
outcomes. Further on, as stated in literature higher education might 
positively influence individuals to explore beyond the enclaves if their own 
ethnic group. 
The positive intermarriage premium is attributable to a faster rate of 
assimilation, which happens because of the marriage. The variable is more 
accentuated when solely the male sample is considered.  
In the literature of discrimination to immigrants in Italy, it is found 
that Muslim communities are discriminated against, which was fostered 
after the twin towers attack. In fact, one third of Italians declared to have 
more fears and distrust towards Arabic and Muslims, after the twin towers 
attack (ISPO, October 2001). It is foreseen that the greatest component of 
the group with the largest linguistic distance to Italian come from a Muslim 
country. The probabilities are high, since Moroccans have always been one 
of the biggest minorities in Italy, (ISTAT, Census 2001 and Census 2011). 
That being said, intermarriage could signal the labor market and reduce the 
discrimination probabilities against the group, resulting in higher earnings. 
The results are in coherence with the findings of Sweden, where 
intermarriage premium is found to be accentuated for individuals from the 
North Africa and Middle East areas (Dribe & Lundh, 2008). Individuals that 
could potentially have bigger room for benefits from intermarriage. 
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Intermarriage rate also measures the assimilation between 
immigrants and the natives; it is broadly recognized as the ultimate measure 
of social cohesion. Therefore, an important conclusion emerges from the 
trends. There is a natural trend to increase intermarriages rate, that is, 
assimilation between natives and immigrants is naturally increasing.  
The rate is more than 10 times higher for native man than for native 
woman. And with its variations, the immigrants’ intermarriage rate indicates 
a greater acceptance of the host society; in this case women have higher 
rates of intermarriage than men, which vary depending on the origin 
country.  
 
9. Conclusions 
This master thesis has investigated the intermarriages effect on 
economic integration of immigrants. More specifically, it concentrated on 
the impact of intermarriage on the earnings of immigrants in Italy compared 
to the co-ethnically married counterparts. Italy has been chosen as the target 
country of this study since it usually attracts unregulated immigration due to 
its geographical location and the existence of relatively high informal 
economy.   
Instrumental variables are applied on Cross-sectional data from the 
Income Survey (Il Bilancio delle Famiglie Italiane) which has been carried 
out within 2004 and 2012.  
There is not evidenced an intermarriage premium for the full sample, 
further on confirmed with the IV estimates where individuals positively 
select into intermarriage. 
The observations have been divided in different groups based on the 
education, ethnic relatedness and gender. Each group has been studied 
individually to study specific characteristics that could boost intermarriage 
benefits. As the result, it has been shown that there is a positive and 
significant effect of intermarriage on the earnings of individuals with higher 
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education from countries where the linguistic distance is the largest. The 
results are sound with empirical findings where individuals have potentially 
higher benefits when marrying a native. The premium is more accentuated 
when considering only the male sample. This might indicate that 
intermarriage fosters the assimilation rate in this category of individuals.  
However the number of the sample is considerably small. Therefore 
the result is not deterministic and a deeper study of the groups is strongly 
advised. 
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